Making a calculated exit in Somalia 2.0

This is an updated version of the previous article containing some new inserts.

As the news seems to suggest that the last bastion for the Al-Shabaab insurgents has been occupied by Kenya Defense Forces ‘(KDF) and Somali TFG fighters, there is a sense that the worst of the fighting is now over and little pockets of resistance remain within Southern Somalia.

However, it is important to note that there are many measures that need to remain in place to ensure lasting security and peace within the Southern sector of Somalia. In a vast arid area, Southern Somalia is not an easy walk over, but represents an arena that has faced little if no development over the last two decades. There are high levels of disenfranchisement, massive levels of people remain displaced and the economic ruin is on a sporadic scale.

Once the KDF and largely AMISOM troops begin to leave Somalia there are sets of various challenges that remain within the area. With a weak central government that is learning to rein in power, coupled with the problem of pleasing the various clans, there are little prospects that the government can survive without some form of external intervention mechanism or assistance for the next few years. This technically means that the international community and the member states that are embroiled in the security operation within Somalia may remain there for the foreseeable future. Little exit strategy plans have been drafted by the United Nations Security Council or the African Union, and there seems to be no conclusive draw down plan for troop withdrawals.

Having such information made public may also render the security operation in jeopardy, since the insurgents other groups of ill repute may lie low and bay time to amass resources and await the foreign departure.  As witnessed in Afghanistan when the United States held a troop draw down in favor of amassing pressure on the Iraqi war, there was little thought left in trying to quell the elements of insurgents that were tucked away in the Afghan highlands, who later on emerged in a more coordinated and financed campaign. With Somalia, the history of how the Al Shabaab came to power only shows that strong institutions must be created and a strict security plan should be adhered to in order as to ensure that there is no threat of a reemergence of any extremist group.

The fragility of the Somali economy that has not received any major boost for the past twenty years means that the Somali government cannot effectively run or function its government without external assistance. Security remains paramount since there are still pockets of resistance that threaten to kill or attack government officials and other installations. These can represent a serious breach towards the development of institutional growth within Somalia.

Did the push by Kenyan troops into Somalia achieve the results and meet the expectations of the big wigs in Nairobi? So far the most significant aim was to ensure that Al Shabaab did not remain with any control of Kismayu (or the Southern Sector), thereby eliminating their financial and tactical base via the port city and their ability to mobilize an army or spread their ideology. As the KDF forces and AMISOM troops seek to stabilize all towns and ensure that Al Shabaab does not regroup, it does diminish the technical capabilities and limits the options available to the terror group. Their only option may be to continue the fighting through guerilla tactics, but this shall have a lesser impact as they had before.

Lessons can be drawn from various crises or wartime reconstruction efforts that are ongoing throughout the world. Somalia however represents a set of complex challenges due to the two decades of conflict it has been facing.

The most important tool that can ensure continued security and lasting peace within Somalia is by ensuring that there is a well trained and effective Somali National Army. By empowering the central government and the army with a well equipped and funded arsenal it can delimit the ability of other rag-tag groups from merging and threatening the Somali government again.

With President Kibaki’s term coming to an end and with a splendid job done in sending in troops to Somalia (a major policy move from a Kenyan president) the job may seem quite done for the administration and a well jotted legacy in the offing. However, the threat posed by any fast moved withdrawal may affect the future of the so far short lived period of calm and tilt the newfound status-quo in another spin off. Talk is also rife that Kenyan troops may also be sent into Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to quell the violence and advancements of the M23. Is this going to be the beginning of over-reach for Kenya's military in light of the economic situation facing the nation? It is important to remember that the Ministry of Finance claimed that the KDF forces under AMISOM have not received any funds from the United Nations to finance the Somali war.

As to when countries should move their troops out of Somalia there needs to be a time line and a clear and stipulated exit strategy. A live and stimulated debate must remain vibrant from the rural homes of Somalia to the capitals of the EAC. A clear time span shall bog down the costs and also mitigate festered expectations. After all, AMISOM continues to try and assure Somali leaders that their troops are not there to occupy, but to assist. Any talk of prolonged stay by foreign troops may gain the insurgents traction in spreading negative propaganda. It was after all the good will of the Somali people that allowed the swift advancement of the AMISOM and TFG troops in territories then occupied by the Al Shabaab, with little opposition in the way, but rather astoundingly with open arms in many rural outlets.

Kismayu may remain liberated for now (par the small remnants of insurgent fighters causing minor havoc) but there needs to be an urgent push to jump start the economy of the town. It has been the gateway into Southern Somalia and has proved to be one of the few all weather ports within the Somali coastal towns. Its commercial viability to a war ravaged country is crucial towards providing jobs and activity to the locals. Under Al Shabaab rule it was estimated that they would collect up to $40 million per year, mainly through the illegal exportation of charcoal to the Middle East.

Problems shall emerge especially when it comes to picking who shall be the next leader of Kismayu port. The history of its leadership is very telling as to the significance of the town itself. Without a strong and capable leader the city may fall back into the hands of the insurgents. If other clans feel that they are not getting a slice of the cake then they shall collude with insurgents of Al Shabaab and try and seize the town. Somalia’s new president is still deliberating on who shall form his next government. The situation remains very complex to deal with.

KDF troops cannot wait for the Mogadishu based government to solve its delicate political acts in order as to form a functioning local administrative authority within Kismayu. Businesses have to begin transacting and the people need to be assured that the foreign troops are not there to stay. Revenues also need to be collected so as to begin the rebuilding process of Kismayu and Somalia.

Charcoal and other gods lying on the road without being exported or sold shall lead to increased local resentment, which can mean that the town can accumulate more sympathy towards the Al Shabaab insurgents, thereby exacerbating the delicate peace within the area.

Military strategists have ultimately achieved a great milestone in restoring and pacifying war torn Somalia. The strategy now shifts to that of restoration and reconciliation. These shall not be achieved through the barrel of the gun but through diplomacy and development. The onus of ensuring lasting peace falls squarely on the Somali government and its ability to address historical injustices. As the guns may grow more silent by the day, Somali’s history shows that a short lull may be pierced with a hail of grief. More action needs to be taken fast to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated and that violence seems the only way to solve problems.

Making a calculated exit in Somalia

As the news seems to suggest that the last bastion for the Al-Shabaab insurgents has been occupied by Kenya Defense Forces ‘(KDF) and Somali TFG fighters, there is a sense that the worst of the fighting is now over and little pockets of resistance remain within Southern Somalia.

However, it is important to note that there are many measures that need to remain in place to ensure lasting security and peace within the Southern sector of Somalia. In a vast arid area, Southern Somalia is not an easy walk over, but represents an arena that has faced little if no development over the last two decades. There are high levels of disenfranchisement, massive levels of people remain displaced and the economic ruin is on a sporadic scale.

Once the KDF and largely AMISOM troops begin to leave Somalia there are sets of various challenges that remain within the area. With a weak central government that is learning to rein in power, coupled with the problem of pleasing the various clans, there are little prospects that the government can survive without some form of external intervention mechanism or assistance for the next few years. This technically means that the international community and the member states that are embroiled in the security operation within Somalia may remain there for the foreseeable future. Little exit strategy plans have been drafted by the United Nations Security Council or the African Union, and there seems to be no conclusive draw down plan for troop withdrawals.

Having such information made public may also render the security operation in jeopardy, since the insurgents other groups of ill repute may lie low and bay time to amass resources and await the foreign departure.  As witnessed in Afghanistan when the United States held a troop draw down in favor of amassing pressure on the Iraqi war, there was little thought left in trying to quell the elements of insurgents that were tucked away in the Afghan highlands, who later on emerged in a more coordinated and financed campaign. With Somalia, the history of how the Al Shabaab came to power only shows that strong institutions must be created and a strict security plan should be adhered to in order as to ensure that there is no threat of a reemergence of any extremist group.

The fragility of the Somali economy that has not received any major boost for the past twenty years means that the Somali government cannot effectively run or function its government without external assistance. Security remains paramount since there are still pockets of resistance that threaten to kill or attack government officials and other installations. These can represent a serious breach towards the development of institutional growth within Somalia.

Did the push by Kenyan troops into Somalia achieve the results and meet the expectations of the big wigs in Nairobi? So far the most significant aim was to ensure that Al Shabaab did not remain with any control of Kismayu (or the Southern Sector), thereby eliminating their financial and tactical base via the port city and their ability to mobilize an army or spread their ideology. As the KDF forces and AMISOM troops seek to stabilize all towns and ensure that Al Shabaab does not regroup, it does diminish the technical capabilities and limits the options available to the terror group. Their only option may be to continue the fighting through guerilla tactics, but this shall have a lesser impact as they had before.

Lessons can be drawn from various crises or wartime reconstruction efforts that are ongoing throughout the world. Somalia however represents a set of complex challenges due to the two decades of conflict it has been facing.

The most important tool that can ensure continued security and lasting peace within Somalia is by ensuring that there is a well trained and effective Somali National Army. By empowering the central government and the army with a well equipped and funded arsenal it can delimit the ability of other rag-tag groups from merging and threatening the Somali government again.

With President Kibaki’s term coming to an end and with a splendid job done in sending in troops to Somalia (a major policy move from a Kenyan president) the job may seem quite done for the administration and a well jotted legacy in the offing. However, the threat posed by any fast moved withdrawal may affect the future of the so far short lived period of calm and tilt the newfound status-quo in another spinoff.

As to when countries should move their troops out of Somalia there needs to be a timeline and a clear and stipulated exit strategy. A live and stimulated debate must remain vibrant from the rural homes of Somalia to the capitals of the EAC. A clear time span shall bog down the costs and also mitigate festered expectations. After all, AMISOM continues to try and assure Somali leaders that their troops are not there to occupy, but to assist. Any talk of prolonged stay by foreign troops may gain the insurgents traction in spreading negative propaganda. It was after all the good will of the Somali people that allowed the swift advancement of the AMISOM and TFG troops in territories then occupied by the Al Shabaab, with little opposition in the way, but rather astoundingly with open arms in many rural outlets.

Military strategists have ultimately achieved a great milestone in restoring and pacifying war torn Somalia. The strategy now shifts to that of restoration and reconciliation. These shall not be achieved through the barrel of the gun but through diplomacy and development. The onus of ensuring lasting peace falls squarely on the Somali government and its ability to address historical injustices. As the guns may grow more silent by the day, Somali’s history shows that a short lull may be pierced with a hail of grief. More action needs to be taken fast to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated and that violence seems the only way to solve problems.

Rising oil prices and Africa's oil future

As international oil prices continue to spike due to the increased anxiety of an impeding war with Iran and the crippling sanctions it faces, with some of Iran's leading oil export destinations siding with the US government in imposing sanctions on buying Iranian oil.

However, the perception in Africa is far more different. Countries along the Eastern African region continue to discover newer oil and natural gas finds in a region that has previously remained unexplored. As a whole, Africa is 5 times less explored than any other continent. So the potential to find newer oil patches are highly plausible. The East African region is slowly heading towards being a key exported of oil in the years to come.

Today oil prices continue to spiral. Within the short term it is expected to remain high, especially due to he speculation over an Israeli attack on Iran. If that eventually takes place there is bound to be an increase in the oil prices, which are hovering at nearly $125 per barrel (selling at $5 a gallon in the US and $8 in France), prices that have historically not been realized.

 America's oil consumption has over the Obama administration steadily declined under the administrations policy of reducing America's dependence on foreign oil reserves. Pump prices have been climbing and this has greatly unnerved the administration because of the upcoming election. The same applies to their Atlantic neighbor, the British administration of PM David Cameron. There was a recent article that indicated a direct correlation between pump prices and the voting in of public officials, and in this scenario Obama is in trouble.

"Make a list of the big issues in the world and put a check next to the ones that have an important energy component. The list is long: Iran; Iraq; the Arab Spring; terrorism; the rise of China; resource competition worldwide; the focus in our pivot to Asia on keeping open sea lanes for the shipment of energy through the Indian Ocean, Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea; the future of the Japanese economy; our concerns about instability in Africa; the rise of the BRICS and other emerging powers." (David Rothkoph, Foreign Policy Magazine article - http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/dear_ayatollah_khamenei_go_ahead_shut_down_those_straits?page=0,1)

African states have largely raised economic growth due to the commodities boom, largely spurred by China's growth. As the Chinese economic forecasts have been re-forecast-ed to signify declining economic growth rates over the next year, African countries will bear the brunt of declining economic growth too. When it comes to oil however, there is bound to be a drop in prices only when sanctions on Iran are lowered or when Saudi Arabia pumps more reserves to meet the demand brought by Iran.

Over the long term, oil exports from African countries may largely help to reduce the international demand. However, Africa's population shall continue to grow at an exponential rate, doubling in size by 2050 to 2 billion people, with the largest growth rates being witnessed in East and West Africa. This shall represent a huger appetite for oil and may lead to increased prices due to ncreasing demand. China's continued growth can also only be fueled by increased oil consumption and India's rise may follow a similar pattern.

Generally, there shall be an increased demand from the East for oil but a large decrease from the West. Western governments are pumping money into looking for newer technologies that rely less on foreign oil and more on new innovations. The oil economy shall continue to remain relevant especially to the East and Africa, and less so for the West. But as for now, oil remains the game changer in building and shaping economies that export it and also changes the politics of nations that are affected by the high prices of oil.